

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA  
FORT WAYNE DIVISION**

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )  
 )  
v. ) Cause No. 1:20-CR-51-HAB  
 )  
CLIFTON HILL )

**OPINION AND ORDER**

Defendant has filed a motion for compassionate release, asserting that COVID-19 and his various medical conditions should get him out of jail early. But, like almost every inmate that files this kind of motion in 2023, he falls well short of showing an extraordinary and compelling reason for release. His motion will be denied.

Generally, a court is statutorily prohibited from modifying a term of imprisonment once imposed. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). A handful of statutory exceptions exist, however, one of which allows a court to grant an inmate compassionate release if the inmate meets certain requirements. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Under this provision, a court may not modify a term of imprisonment except that –

(1) in any case --

(A) the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier . . . after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, . . . finds that—

(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction . . .

. . . and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission[.]

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).

Because Defendant, not the Director of the BOP, filed the motion, Defendant must first show that he has satisfied the statutory exhaustion requirement. The Government concedes that Defendant has properly exhausted his remedies. (ECF No. 67 at 6–7).

Congress did not define “extraordinary and compelling reasons” in the statute, instead delegating the matter to the Sentencing Commission to promulgate a policy statement that “describe[s] what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction, including the criteria to be applied and a list of specific examples.” 28 U.S.C. § 994(t). The policy statement, in United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) § 1B1.13 and the accompanying Application Notes, have not been amended to reflect the First Step Act’s change to § 3582(c)(1)(A) allowing prisoners to bring compassionate release claims directly. *United States v. Gunn*, 980 F.3d 1178, 1180 (7th Cir. 2020)<sup>1</sup>. As a result, “§ 1B1.13 and its application notes provide useful – but not binding – guidance to courts in determining whether a defendant has identified an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release.” *United States v. Hoskins*, No. 2:99 CR 117, 2020 WL 7640408, at \*2 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 23, 2020) (citing *Gunn*, 938 F.3d at 1180). Indeed, “[d]istrict judges must operate under the statutory criteria – ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ – subject to deferential appellate review.” *Gunn*, 980 F.3d at 1181.

Using the guidance of §1B1.13 to inform the statutory criteria, the court considers the medical condition of the defendant, his age, his family circumstances, and whether there is in the defendant’s case an extraordinary or compelling reason “other than or in combination with” the other reasons described in the Application Notes. Second, the Court determines whether the

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<sup>1</sup> Yet as *Gunn* made clear, the Guidelines’ requirement that the court consider whether the reduction is otherwise “consistent with this policy statement” does not limit a district judge’s discretion. This is because the statute by which the district court is bound requires a reduction to track “applicable policy statements.” And the Sentencing Commission has not yet issued a policy statement “applicable” to Defendant’s request. Thus, *Gunn* held, “[a]ny decision is ‘consistent with’ a nonexistent policy statement.” *Gunn*, 980 F.3d at 1180

defendant is “a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(2). Finally, the Court considers the § 3553(a) factors, “to the extent they are applicable.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13.

Courts in this Circuit were once forced to go through an extended analysis when COVID-19 was raised as the extraordinary and compelling reason. That analysis is no longer necessary. Almost two years ago, the Seventh Circuit all but eliminated COVID-19 as a basis for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). In *United States v. Broadfield*, 5 F.4th 801 (7th Cir. 2021), the court stated:

Section 3582(c)(1)(A) was enacted and amended before the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, and it will continue to serve a beneficent function long after the pandemic ends. But for the many prisoners who seek release based on the special risks created by COVID-19 for people living in close quarters, vaccines offer relief far more effective than a judicial order. A prisoner who can show that he is unable to receive or benefit from a vaccine still may turn to this statute, but, for the vast majority of prisoners, the availability of a vaccine makes it impossible to conclude that the risk of COVID-19 is an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for immediate release.

*Id.*

Vaccination is available to Defendant: as of today, 632 inmates at FCI Morgantown have been fully vaccinated.<sup>2</sup> While Defendant claims he is “contraindicated” to receive the vaccine, (ECF No. 65 at 5–6), there is nothing in his medical records that bears this out. Instead, Defendant has WebMD-ed his diagnosis, citing to a CDC document with no specific application to him. COVID-19, then, cannot provide Defendant with the relief he seeks. This is true whether Defendant characterizes the argument as simply COVID-19, the BOP’s pandemic plan, or the BOP’s inadequate medical care.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> <https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/index.jsp>

<sup>3</sup> Because the Court does not find extraordinary and compelling reasons supporting release, it need not address the § 3553(a) factors. See *Thacker*, 4 F.4th at 576 (consideration of the § 3553(a) factors is required only “upon a finding that the prisoner has supplied such a [extraordinary and compelling] reason”).

For these reasons, Defendant's motion for compassionate release (ECF No. 65) is DENIED.

SO ORDERED on April 25, 2023.

s/ Holly A. Brady  
JUDGE HOLLY A. BRADY  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT